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Abstract
All possible removals of n = 5 nodes from networks of size N = 100 are per-
formed in order to find the optimal set of nodes which fragments the original
network into the smallest largest connected component. The resulting attacks
are ordered according to the size of the largest connected component and com-
pared with the state of the art methods of network attacks. We chose attacks of
size 5 on relative small networks of size 100 because the number of all possible
attacks,
(
100
5
)
≈ 108, is at the verge of the possible to compute with the available
standard computers. Besides, we applied the procedure in a series of networks
with controlled and varied modularity, comparing the resulting statistics with
the effect of removing the same amount of vertices, according to the known most
efficient disruption strategies, i.e., High Betweenness Adaptive attack (HBA),
Collective Index attack (CI), and Modular Based Attack (MBA). Results show
that modularity has an inverse relation with robustness, with Qc ≈ 0.7 being
the critical value. For modularities lower than Qc, all heuristic method gives
mostly the same results than with random attacks, while for bigger Q, networks
are less robust and highly vulnerable to malicious attacks.
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1. Introduction
Robustness of complex networks is a very important issue in a wide range
of distinct applied disciplines such as physics, biology, engineering, sociology
and criminology or police science [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]– just to name a few. Network
theory provides the natural framework for the systematic study of the robust-
ness/weakness of interconnected systems; in particular, to help identify the key
topological factors which play a crucial role in the cohesion of a networked
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system. For instance, scale-free graphs are fragile to the targeted removal of
its highest degree (hubs) nodes, while random graphs loose its cohesion after
the random deletion of a critical fraction of vertices. However, the problem of
finding the minimal set of nodes that if removed would break the network into
non-extensive components is NP-hard [6] and has no general analytic solution.
Indeed, it is a combinatorial complexity problem, for if we want to know which
set of n nodes produces the maximum damage in a network of size N , all pos-
sibilities must be tried which is a total of
(
N
n
)
sets. Even for relatively small
networks, the problem could be computationally intractable depending on the
number of nodes that we want to remove. For example, checking the effect of
removing 10 nodes from a small network of size 50 gives ≈ 1010 different sets
to verify which one is the optimum. Therefore, many suboptimal methods have
been proposed in the last few years [7, 8, 9, 10, 11], they are based on different
heuristic rankings and are computationally efficient. Morone and Makse, for ex-
ample, have shown that the so called “weak nodes” identified by the Collective
Influence algorithm (CI), i.e. the ones with low-degree surrounded by hierar-
chical coronas of hubs, are powerful influencers [12]. However, many networks
tend to group into modular structures —clusters densely connected internally
but weakly linked among them—, in a way that affects the network robust-
ness. Such was shown recently for modular networks [13], pointing out that
bridges connecting communities are more prominent to network cohesion than
hubs or Morone and Makse’s “weak” nodes. Moreover, the assumption of lo-
cal tree-like structure, central in Morone and Makse algorithm, does not apply
for modular networks. In this sense, Kobayashi and Masuda [14] combined the
Morone-Makse algorithm and coarse graining to propose a method of fragment-
ing networks by targeting collective influencers at mesoscopic level, proving to
outperform the original algorithm for modular networks at a reasonable com-
putational cost.
Modular networks are quite different from pure random or small-world net-
works for example. Indeed, the modularity feature of a given network signals
the presence of other than pure random connection among nodes; something
inherent of social networks for instance, where individual tend to form com-
munities. Besides, modularity is known to play a key role in a wide variety of
phenomena, from crime [5] to brain networks [15] for example.
Regarding robustness, interdependent modular networks are known to be
much more vulnerable than typical graphs, and localized disruptions can give
rise to powerful avalanches in power grids, biological, and financial networks [16,
17]. Phase transitions in modular networks from a connected to a dismantled
phase are more abrupt than in typical graphs. Moreover, Shekhtman et al.
developed a theoretical framework for network disruption of modular networks
showing that such systems might undergo either a double first-order phase tran-
sition (inter and intra-module fragmentations when there are fewer modules
densely intra-connected) or a single one (when there are many modules inter-
connected) [18].
Noteworthy, Module-Based (MBA) and High Betweenness Adaptive (HBA)
attacks are known to atomize modular networks with the least number of re-
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movals, with MBA being computationally much more feasible [19]. However, it
is not clear yet how close are these methods to the optimal fragmentation point,
which is the largest connected component of minimum size that results after n
nodes are removed. Indeed, it is not known from what value of modularity the
modular property stands out, for example. This is precisely what we address
in the present contribution. In order to do that, we perform a brute-force com-
putational analyses, generating all
(
N
n
)
possible lists of removal, and comparing
the resulting statistics with HBA, CI, and MBA methods of attack.
In the next section, we present the method, including the description of
network benchmark, the brute force, and the heuristic method of attacks. Then
the results are presented with the statistic of brute force attacks compared with
the heuristic procedures. The final section is devoted to conclusions.
2. Method
2.1. Networks
In order to generate graphs exhibiting community structure and heteroge-
neous node degree distribution, we use the LFR Benchmark, which is an artificial
graphs benchmark developed with the aim of testing community detection algo-
rithms [20]. In the LFR benchmark, the modularity of a network is controlled
by the mixing parameter µ which represents the fraction of a node’s links with
nodes outside the community to which such node belongs.
Considering a complete partition that organizes a given network into several
communities, a general expression for calculating the partition’s modularity of
that network is given by [21]
Q =
1
2m
∑
i,j
[
Aij −
kikj
2m
]
δ(ci, cj), (1)
where Aij is the adjacency matrix (Aij=1 if nodes i and j are connected and
0 otherwise), ki is the vertex degree of node i, ci is the community to which
node i belongs to, m is the total number of edges, and δ(ci, cj) = 1 if nodes
i and j belong to the same community and 0 otherwise. The modularity Q is
then a scalar value between −1 and 1, which points if the local link density
of the subgraphs defined by this partition differs from the expected density
in a randomly wired network. Negative values of modularity mean the nodes
in the subgraphs do not form communities. If Q is zero then the connectivity
between the nodes inside the subgraph are random, fully explained by the degree
distribution. When Q > 0 the partition is said to be suboptimal up to Q ∼ 0.5,
a value which might be due to statistical fluctuations of random networks, but
with no “true” communities separation. Thence, we are interested in networks
with Q ' 0.5, which show optimal partition [22].
Therefore we generate 157 networks with modularity varying from 0.567 to
0.853, tunable by the mixing parameter µ that lies inside the interval [0.1, 0.6].
The generated networks also show a total number of nodes N = 100, average
degree 〈k〉 = 3, and maximum degree kmax = 6.
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2.2. Brute Force Attacks
Brute force attacks stands for the evaluation of all possible attacks of size n
on a network of size N , i.e counting the remaining size of the biggest connected
component after deleting n nodes. As there are
(
N
n
)
possible choices for the
n nodes in a network of size N , this is a hard problem, generally unfeasible
except for limited attacks on relatively small networks. In this contribution we
chose networks of size N = 100 over which we perform attacks removing n = 5
nodes, as a sensible compromise between interesting and/or representative sizes
(resembling or approaching real interesting system) and computational cost.
Even when n = 5 could seem a very discrete attack, it represents 5% of the nodes
of a network of size N = 100, which is a sensible attack. Therefore, for each
network generated, we perform an attack by removing 5 out of the 100 nodes,
giving
(
100
5
)
≈ 108 of total computed attacks for each network tested 1. Since
our interest is in the damage caused, for each one of those attacks, we record
the size of the graph’s remaining giant component, GC. Notice that after the
removal of n nodes from a network of size N , we have always 1 ≤ GC ≤ N −n.
2.3. Heuristic Methods
In what follows, we compare the results of the empirical brute force attacks
with those obtained through the application of well established heuristic meth-
ods of network fragmentation. Three methods were used for that purpose which
are described bellow:
High Betweenness Adaptive Attack (HBA): it classifies a graph’s nodes
according to the betweenness centrality measure in descending order. Between-
ness centrality measure for a node v can be defined as:
g(v) =
∑
s6=v 6=t
σst(v)
σst
, (2)
where σst is the number of shortest paths between nodes s and t, and σst(v) is
the number of those paths that pass through node v.
Module-Based Attack (MBA): This method starts by identifying the mod-
ular structure of the network through a community detection algorithm, such
as the Louvain method [23]. The nodes that connect communities are ordered
by their betweenness centrality, so that the ones with highest betweenness are
removed [13].
Collective Influence (CI): Removes nodes according to their Collective In-
fluence score [12]. For a node i, Collective Influence can be defined as:
CIℓ(i) = (ki − 1)
∑
j∈∂B(i,ℓ)
(kj − 1), (3)
1The CPU time to compute the ≈ 108 different attacks necessary to make the histogram
of Figure 1 is ≈ 45′ in an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 3.60GHz per CPU. For a network of size
N = 200, that time would increase to roughly one day.
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where kj is the degree of the nodes in the edge of a ball of radius around node
i, and ki is the degree of node i. Like HBA, it is an adaptive method.
3. Results
The main result we present is the damage inflicted by each attack on the
original graph. We measure the damage in terms of the size of the remaining
largest connected component (GC). Figure 1 shows the result of the brute-force
attack of size n = 5 to two examples of networks of size N = 100, but different
modularity. Each bar represents the number (height) of attacks that reduces the
network to the corresponding size (position) of the giant component. Clearly,
by performing an heuristic attack it will give much better results, in terms of
damage, that a random selection. As removing 5% of the nodes, in 99% of the
cases, the remaining largest connected component is bigger than 80% of the
original one (Figure 3 shows the probability of obtaining a certain damage in a
random attack).
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Figure 1: Histograms of all
(
100
5
)
possible attacks of n = 5 nodes on two networks of size
N = 100, but different modularity, Q = 0.759 and Q = 0.808 as indicated in the figure. The
horizontal axis represents the size of the remaining giant component (GC) after deleting 5
nodes and the vertical axis is the number of attacks producing the same GC. The colored
vertical lines represent the value of GC after the attacks according to the heuristic procedures
MBA (solid red), HBA (dashed green), and CI (dot dashed blue). The black dotted line
represents the expected value of GC. The optimal fragmentation points are GC = 39 for the
Q = 0.759 network and GC = 21 for the Q = 0.808 network.
.
All the quantities presented in this contribution are averages performed over
ranges of modularity in intervals of size ∆Q = 0.02. Figure 2 exhibits all the
results of the brute force attacks, along with the heuristic methods results as
well, as a function of the modularity. That figure condenses a good part of the
results of the present contribution; it shows the remaining largest component
sizes while varying the modularity, for different types of attacks. The solid black
and full circles curve represents the best possible attack to a network, i.e. the
one that reduces the giant component to its lowest value. We also show the
average values for a random attack which is obtained by computing the average
of all possible attacks (cross and dashed black curve) of size n = 5. The three
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Figure 2: GC after removing 5 nodes according to the three heuristic method analyzed (MBA,
HBA, and CI) vs modularity Q of the networks. Each points represents the GC averaged over
several realization of networks for a fixed Q. Lower curve is the optimal attack obtained after
checking all possible ones. Upper curve is the average GC over all possible attacks.
middle curves display the values for targeted attacks: MBA (star and red line),
HBA (triangle and green line), and CI (diamond and blue line).
The figure shows that the difference between the expected value of random
attacks and the optimal dismantling point increases with modularity, setting
the upper and lower limits respectively for any heuristic attack. One clear
conclusion is that randomly removing a set of nodes becomes less efficient as
topological communities become more prominent. Moreover, as the modularity
increases the remaining largest connected component becomes smaller and the
network itself becomes less robust to any kind of attack, even a random one.
In Figure 6 we show the ratio between the average of attacks and the optimal
value of the remaining giant component as a function of modularity. Both values,
expected and optimal, are calculated for each network by means of the brute-
force attack. Clearly there is a high correlation between these two quantities,
as well as a rapid increase in the area of medium (Q ≈ 0.7) to high modularity
(Q ' 0.7).
In Figure 3 we can notice that the slope of the curves of the heuristic meth-
ods, as well the expected values curve, decrease as the modularity increases,
which is expected since the number of nodes that can dismantle the network
easily also increases along with the modularity. This result confirms the theoret-
ical observation of Shekhtman et al. that as the modularity increases networks
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Figure 3: GC after removing 5 nodes for the three heuristic method analyzed (MBA, HBA,
and CI) vs modularity Q of the networks. Each point represents the GCS averaged over bins
of size ∆Q = 0.02, and after applying a moving average with a window of two points. Shadow
region around the curve represents the standard deviation of the result over the different
realizations for each modularity. The Average curve is the average over all realization and all
possible attacks for each one of them. Shadow region represents the standard deviation.
tend to be more fragile, even facing a single fragmentation phase transition when
facing failures [18].
The heuristic approach to network fragmentation shows two distinct regimes.
For modularities lower than a critical value qc (which we determine below), the
heuristic attacks curves distance themselves from the optimal point. After the
inflection point the difference between the size of the giant component in the
optimal strategy and in the heuristic attacks starts to diminish until the MBA
and HBA attacks get very close to the optimum dismantling point at 0.86.
However, for high values of modularity the difference between optimal, HBA,
and MBA results is such that time complexity should be taken into account
when searching for the optimal dismantling set for larger networks.
To measure the critical value Qc at which the attack curves start to get
closer to the optimal dismantling set we plot the ratio of the remaining largest
connected component after each attack and the optimum point as depicted in
Figure 5. The local maximum point is then estimated by interpolating the first
derivative of these data. These maxima point are QCIc = 0.81, Q
MBA
c = 0.78
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of probabilities of GC resulting after a random attack of
size n = 5 in a network of size N = 100. The distribution is the result of all attacks over all
157 realizations. It can be seen that while 1% of the attacks results in a network reductions to
more or less 50% of the original size, the probability of a random attack reducing the network
to a component of 20% or less of its original size is ≈ 1 in a million.
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Figure 5: GC ratio of the three heuristic methods relative to the optimum point as a function
of modularity. Each point represents a different network realization for a given modularity ac-
cording to the LFR benchmark. Squares represent the average and the line is an interpolation.
Grey region represent the standard deviation at each modularity value. Left: MBA, Center:
HBA, and Right: CI. For each method, the red vertical line shows the local maximum, since
where each heuristic strategy begins to re-approach the optimum fragmentation QCIc = 0.81,
QMBAc = 0.78 and Q
HBA
c = 0.73.
and QHBAc = 0.73 (see Figure 5), meaning that in the range 0.65 / Q ≤ Qc
the heuristic strategies detach from the optimal point and may not show better
results than an average over several random strategies, which shows an inflection
point at ∼ 0.73 (see Figure 6). On the other hand, for high values of modularity,
above Qc, the heuristic strategies starts once again to get closer to the optimal
dismantling set and a thence more efficient than the expected value for random
realizations.
It is important to note that due to the computational complexity of the
optimal dismantling set problem, we had to restrict this study to N = 100
nodes. This results in important finite size effects such as structural cutoffs
of the degree distribution, impacting the overall network robustness. In this
sense, the structural cutoff limits the maximum degree, which in turn restricts
both the degree correlations and the range of modularity LFR models are able
to generate [24]. Another relevant discussion is the sensibility of our results
to degree distribution. In a network with an arbitrary degree distribution, the
critical fraction threshold of failures or targeted attacks for the existence of a
giant component usually depends on the degree distribution [22]. However, due
to the network size limitations of this experimental study, one cannot measure
precisely the sensibility of our experiment to the average degree distribution,
and we must keep a fixed degree distribution in order to generate networks with
varying modularity in an acceptable range. Therefore, we have kept a fixed
average degree < k >∼ 3, studying only the sensibility of the LFR benchmark
networks to the modularity Q.
4. Discussion
Modular networks are known to be fragile in general, but since what values
of modularity this weakness stands out? To fill this gap we propose a com-
putational experiment to check how heuristic methods are really close to the
optimum dismantling set. We do so by working with finite networks of size
N = 100 and checking all
(
100
5
)
≈ 108 possible removal lists of 5 nodes, due to
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Figure 6: Ratio between the average of attacks and the optimal one as a function of modularity.
Each point represents the ratio for a network realization at each value of modularity. The blue
and red lines are linear regressions of the data below Q = 0.73 and above Q = 0.7 respectively,
resulting in an intersection at Qc ≈ 0.71. Blue line: r2 = 0.62, standard error = 0.19. Red
line: r2 = 0.83, standard deviation = 1.0.
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computational limitations. Networks are generated according to the LFR algo-
rithm, and have k ∼ 3 and modularity Q ranging from 0.59 to 0.85. The optimal
point curve sets the lower limit to what is expected of the heuristic methods,
we can see that as the modularity rises, the three middle curves approach the
optimal values, the expected values curve also tends towards it, but much more
slowly.
Firstly, results show the upper (expected) and lower (optimal) curves which
represent the worst and the best scenarios in terms of damage to a network.
The behavior of those two curves with the modularity is very significant,
showing a clear gap between the two, which spreads out when modularity in-
creases. As a general trend, it is evident that the damage of any kind of attack,
even random ones, has a negative correlation with modularity, i.e modularity is
inversely related with robustness. Indeed, not only MBA shows a better perfor-
mance with modularity as expected, but HBA, and CI too. The reason is that
the optimum attack (the black line and dot curve) shows a monotonic inverse
dependence with Q. However, for modularity Q / 0.7 heuristic and random
attacks are very similar, and the only way to inflict a more serious attack to
a network with modularity in that range is by brute force, so we can say that
a network in that range is relatively safe against random or malicious limited
attacks —considering the removal of only 5% of nodes.
CI and MBA attacks are almost equivalent in efficiency (with MBA showing
better performance), except for large values of modularity after a critical point
(QCIc = 0.81 and Q
MBA
c = 0.78). HBA is always the best heuristic method of
attack, but for values of Q > 0.7 as we explained before, and goes very close
to the optimum attack for large values of modularity (QHBAc = 0.73) but with
high computational cost.
One should note, nonetheless, the many limitation of our study. As afore-
mentioned, due to computational limitations, we could only remove 5 out of
100 nodes which even with the optimum set cannot fully stop the networks
from having giant components. This same restraint implied that in order to
study the sensibility of network robustness to modularity we had to keep the
average degree constant and could not check the variability of our study to con-
nectivity. Again, this limitation also implies finite size size effects such as high
degree cutoff of the degree distribution, impacting network robustness.
Recently, Wandelt et al. presented a detailed and exhaustive performance
comparison between 13 heuristic methods of network attack based on several
criteria, including all the methods tested here. [25] They came to a similar
conclusion as the one we arrived in that HBA is the best method in producing
the greatest damage, not taking into consideration the scalability of running
time. One of the best alternative methods of fragmentation ends up being the
approximated version of HBA, for the achieved results are similar with much
lower computational cost.
The authors also point out that wile HBA and its approximated version ob-
tain equivalent results for certain types of networks, the correlation between the
sequence of nodes that each method selects for removal is low, pointing towards
the existence of different “paths” to the optimal fragmentation. This is one
11
aspect we were able to observe, because most networks used in our experiment
do show many different sequences of nodes that, when removed, dismantle the
network to the smallest giant component.
Due to the infeasibility that was early mentioned, Wandelt et al. could not
compare any method with the optimal removal of nodes. In this sense, the
brute force analysis of the relation between heuristic methods and the optimal
fragmentation point in a varying modularity scenario is the main contribution
of our study.
Moreover, we estimated an empirical critical point from which heuristic
methods get close enough to the optimal dismantling set, serving as a guide
to choosing the most efficient fragment strategy for real modular networks. All
in all, even considering the limitations of this study, our experimental results
support previous theoretical researches that indicate intrinsic vulnerabilities of
modular networks, pointing out to modularity as the Achilles’ heel of real net-
works.
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